Linux Kernel

severity

7.8

published

Page cache overflow in fs/fuse

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: reject oversized dirents in page cache fuse_add_dirent_to_cache() computes a serialized dirent size from the server-controlled namelen field and copies the dirent into a single page-cache page. The existing logic only checks whether the dirent fits in the remaining space of the current page and advances to a fresh page if not. It never checks whether the dirent itself exceeds PAGE_SIZE. As a result, a malicious FUSE server can return a dirent with namelen=4095, producing a serialized record size of 4120 bytes. On 4 KiB page systems this causes memcpy() to overflow the cache page by 24 bytes into the following kernel page. Reject dirents that cannot fit in a single page before copying them into the readdir cache.

CVSS v3.1

7.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS v3.1

7.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS v3.1

7.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Explore our other findings

CVE-2026-64450

9.1

Out-of-bounds read in net/tipc In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts (sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz(). The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen) break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the receive skb with an attacker-controlled count: this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt), GFP_ATOMIC); A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400, bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out of the much smaller skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69 Call trace: kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80 tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0 tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4 tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0) The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how they are used. The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;" skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means "legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state.

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BYNARIO s.r.l. | PIAZZA BORROMEO 12, 20129 MILAN, ITALY | VAT- IT14434720968

all rights reserved

2026

BYNARIO s.r.l. | PIAZZA BORROMEO 12, 20129 MILAN, ITALY | VAT- IT14434720968

all rights reserved

2026

BYNARIO s.r.l. | PIAZZA BORROMEO 12, 20129 MILAN, ITALY | VAT- IT14434720968

all rights reserved

2026